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Despite both socio-economic and equitable reasons to consider workers'1 interests
in boardroom decision-making, 2 corporate boards have usually ignored such interests,
and corporate law in the United States generally has not imposed a fiduciary duty on
these boards to take account of those interests. 3 Yet the social and economic
consequences of corporate boards' lack of concern for workers' interests in the corporate
decision-making process are dire.4 Between 1983 and 1988, 9.7 million employees lost
their jobs due to layoffs and plant closings.5 In addition to losing their jobs, these
displaced workers often also lose their health and pension benefits, deplete their savings,
lose their homes to foreclosures, and must increasingly rely on public welfare.
6
Nonetheless, corporate decision-making concerning such layoffs and plant closings has
focused exclusively on shareholder interests while disregarding workers' interests.
7
Extending fiduciary protections to workers, however, minimizes these social harms by
ensuring that directors and managers consider the interests of workers in such decisions.
Sadly, conditions for employed workers are not much better. Regardless of
increasingly high corporate profits, hourly wages for the bottom 80% of workers have
1 The term "workers" includes working class employees who generally work for wages in low-skill manual,
clerical, and retail positions, such as in construction, factory work, technical installation, data entry, or
department store sales. Their jobs typically lack autonomy and supervisory responsibility and often do not
require a college education.
2 See infranotes 3-19 and accompanying text.
3 See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (stating that "[t]he
Revlon board argued that it acted in good faith in protecting the noteholders because Unocal permits
consideration of other corporate constituencies. Although such considerations may be permissible, there are
fundamental limitations upon that prerogative. A board may have regard for various constituencies in
discharging its responsibilities, provided there are rationally related benefits accruing to the
stockholders."); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) ("[i]n carrying out their managerial
roles, directors are charged with an unyielding fiduciary duty to the corporation and its shareholders.");
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 682 (Mich. 1919) (stating that "[t]here should be no confusion
(of which there is evidence) of the duties which Mr. Ford conceives that he and the stockholders owe to the
general public and the duties which in law he and his codirectors [sic] owe to protesting, minority
stockholders. A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the
stockholders.").
4 See Marleen A. O'Connor, Restructuring the Corporation's Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing a Fiduciary
Duty to Protect Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. REv. 1189, 1192 (1991) (describing the results of
substantial layoffs by Safeway Stores, Inc.).
'Id. at 1197.
6 Id. at 1198.
7 See id. at 1199 (stating that"..., recent corporate restructuring has brought about a sudden change in
labor relations.., currently, corporations seek to accelerate the timetable to reduce the workforce to the
lowest possible level. In the process, many corporations display a diminishing regard for employees.").
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fallen in the decade between 1990 and 2000. 8 Even in the late 1990s, with a booming
stock market, the richest 10% of the U.S. population received 85.8% of gains, while a
typical American worker was working more hours for less pay. 9 In fact, almost 30% of
workers' wages are not high enough to raise them out of poverty.' 0 According to a US
Census Bureau study, 18% of all workers in 1990 earned incomes so low that, despite
fulltime employment, they placed a family of four below the poverty line." The low
quality of life these workers experience in contrast to the lucrative lifestyles enjoyed by
their managers, supervisors, and corporate executives 12 has resulted in the highest level of
income inequality since 1967,13 an increasing concentration of corporate income in the
hands of capital owners, and a corresponding decrease in employees' share of corporate
compensation. 14
Additionally, there are numerous equitable reasons that warrant consideration of
workers' interests in corporate decision-making.' 5 Workers make investments in human
capital to the firm, justifying an integration of their concerns in corporate boardroom
deliberation.16 While it is clear that workers who need to develop firm-specific skills
make such an investment, a worker who merely contributes transferable skills such as
basic time and labor has made such an investment as well.17 Moreover, employees form a
reliance interest in their long-term employment relationship with companies.' 8 For
8 See Kent Greenfield, There's a Forrest in Those Trees: Teaching About the Role of Corporations -in




See Joseph William Singer, Jobs and Justice: Rethinking the Stakeholder Debate, 43 U. TORONTO L.J.
475, 476 (1993).
12 Greenfield, supra note 8, at 66 (stating that "[t]wenty years ago, pay for executive chief officers was less
than 30 times that of the average worker. Now, the typical CEO makes over 400 times that of the average
worker.").
" Between 1967 and 2005, income for the lower limit of the highest household income quintile increased
almost four times more than the increase in median household income during this period. See U.S. Census
Bureau, "Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2005" (August 2006), at
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/reports.html (indicating that median household income
increased only about $11,000 - from $35,379 to $46,326, and noting that the lower limit of the highest
household income quintile in 2005 was $91,705). Compare U.S. Census Burea, "The Changing Shape of
the Nation's Income Distribution: 1947-1998" (June 2000), at
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/reports.htm (stating that the lower limit of the highest
household income quintile in 1967 was $53,170, reflecting an increase of almost $40,000 for this income
level between 1967 and 2005).
14 See Economic Policy Institute, "Economic Snapshots" (Jan. 17, 2007), available . at
http://www.epi.org/content.cfn?id=2604 (last accessed April 2, 2007) (stating that "[t]he most recent data
(third quarter of 2006) reveal that owners of capital received 23.0% of all corporate income, the highest
since 1966. That means that the compensation of employees was at the lowest share in over 25 years.").
15 See Kent Greenfield, The Place of Workers in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. REv. 283, 283-287 (1998)
(stating that "by any account, workers provide essential inputs to a corporation's productive activities, and.
... the success of the business enterprise quite often turns on the success of the relationship between the
corporation and those who are employed by it... justifications for shareholder dominance - ownership,
agency costs, the residual nature of their claims and inability to contract - are not as strong as generally
proposed or often apply to workers as well.").
16 Id._at 289-300.
7 See id. (explaining a property basis for shareholders' ights).





example, when a plant closes, the laid off workers may face long-term unemployment or
under-employment, loss of family wealth, and health and family problems.
19
Consequently, if a company is considering closing a plant, it should consider the
problems borne by the workers with whom it has established a long-term relationship.20
The means available for workers to pursue their interests under the current legal
regime are ineffective. First, it is argued that workers can contract with employers for
specific protections, such as veto power over corporate acts. 22 Workers, however, are
unlikely to garner such contractual protections because employers often have no duty to
negotiate over certain issues pertinent to workers, employers often have greater leverage
in negotiations, and many contingent events affecting worker interests cannot be foreseen
at the negotiation stage.23 Moreover, the mere usurpation of fiduciary protections by
shareholders causes workers to question the enforceability of employment contract terms
24and agreements between workers and management. For example, a firm may want to
defer a bonus to a worker until the firm's prospects improve or pay low wages now in
exchange for higher wages later, but the worker will be reluctant to assent to such
requests due to the belief that management's fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of
shareholders compels management to use that extra money to further shareholder
interests. 25 Thus, workers cannot effectively contract with management both because of
their limited negotiating leverage and because shareholders' exclusive fiduciary rights
may subject their contractual agreements with management to judicial scrutiny.26
Second, it is argued that workers can protect their interests through employment
and labor law rather than resort to corporate fiduciary obligations.2 7 This argument,
however, rests on the inaccurate assumption that corporate law should primarily concern
itself with protecting the contractual relationship of constituencies rather than deal with
normative concerns, such as the economic and societal consequences of its laws.
28
Moreover, because labor law is primarily concerned with regulating the union-employer
relationship, and employment law generally addresses only every-day employment
1
9 Id.
20 Id. at 724-25 (explaining the moral principles behind this idea).
21 See Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the
Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23, 36-38 (1991) (describing
the fallbacks of nonshareholder constituency statutes).
22 See id. (describing the many assurances and rights that workers could potentially receive through contract
negotiations).
23 See Greenfield, supra note 15, at 313-21 (outlining the assumptions contractarian theory makes about a
worker's ability to bargain during negotiations).
24 See Oliver Hart, An Economist's View of Fiduciary Duty, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 299, 306-7 (1993) (stating
that "[m]anagement's promise not to renege is harder to sustain, however, if its fiduciary duty to
shareholders is interpreted narrowly. The reason is that ex post, when management gives the worker his
deferred compensation or gives the supplier a generous portion of the quasi-rents from the relationship,
shareholders can sue, claiming that the money belongs to them. Anticipating this, of course, workers will
not be prepared to undergo an apprenticeship or postpone compensation .....
25 Id. (giving bonus deferral as an example).
26 id.
27 See Greenfield, supra note 15, at 283 (stating that "[tihe justification for insulating the concerns of
workers from the attention of corporate law is that such concerns are the subject of other areas of law, most
prominently labor law and employment law.").
See KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS, PROGRESSIVE
POSSIBILITIES 125-27, 153-55 (2007).
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relations, these areas of law often do not address the most pressing issues for workers,
such as plant closings.
29
Third, even if individual workers cannot garner the leverage to contract with
employers, and even if employment and labor laws often do not address worker-related
issues, unions can use their collective leverage to bargain for worker protections.30 The
effectiveness of unions to bargain for worker protections is mitigated, however, by a
number of practical considerations and observations. 31 First, only a small percentage of
32workers in the U.S. are represented by unions. Second, employers do not have the
obligation to bargain with unions on many issues important to workers, such as plant
closings.33 Therefore, it is clear that although workers have a number of avenues through
which to address their interests under the current regime, none adequately or effectively
ensure the consideration of worker interests in making corporate decisions. As a method
to address the current disregard for worker interests in corporate decision-making, this
note proposes extending fiduciary duties to workers. An accurate understanding of
fiduciary duties will reveal that this proposal is both practical and effective.
Part I of the note begins by examining why fiduciary duties have traditionally
been limited only to shareholders and then criticizes the reasons for such a shareholder-
dominance rule. This section demonstrates that the rationales commonly advanced in
favor of restricting fiduciary duties are severely flawed.
Part II questions the feasibility of imposing a fiduciary obligation on corporate
board members and managers to consider worker interests. Indeed, even if workers
should be given these rights normatively due to their important status in the corporation
and the ineffectiveness of current avenues to address their rights and interests, these
rights must withstand the scrutiny of practical objections and obstacles. 34 The section will
conclude that extension of fiduciary duties to workers can overcome obstacles because
worker and shareholder interests often unite, because corporate law has always been able
to reconcile competing interests, and because the inefficiencies critics warn of have not
occurred in other countries who afford greater protections to labor.
35
29 1d. atCh. 3, p. 2.
30 See O'Connor, supra note 4, at 1215 (explaining that "many commentators assume that unions will
bargain to protect their members from the consequences of layoffs and plant closings.").
" See id. at 1216-22 (discussing "the possible reasons why unionized employees have not sought
contractual provisions to mitigate the consequences of restructuring").
32 Id. at 1215 (stating that "less than twenty percent of the work force is unionized.").
33 See id. at 1216 (explaining that "Professor Stone describes the situations as follows: 'at the same time
that corporate investment decisions are causing massive layoffs throughout the unionized sectors, the labor
laws are being reinterpreted to give unions less and less input into corporate decision making."').
14 See Bernard Black, Corporate Law and Residual Claimants (Berkeley Program in Law and Economics,
Working Paper Series 22, 1999), available at http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/
viewcontent.egi?article=1045&context=blewp (last accessed April 2, 2007) (discussing why residual
claimants typically do not receive control rights and "why employees receive no formal control rights even
though they are major residual claimants.").
35 See Mitu Gulati, Incorporating Labor, 22 COMp. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 171, 172 (2000) (referencing an
article by O'Connor which points out that both Japanese and German corporate law systems "provide labor
a far greater role than does the American system." The authors go onto state that "[g]iven the ability of
corporations from these countries to compete on equal footing (and sometimes outcompete) their U.S.
counterparts, this suggests that a greater governance role for labor will not bring with it all the




Part III will consider both various mechanisms for extending fiduciary obligations
to workers as well as alternative ways to address the problem of insufficient concern for
workers in corporate decision-making without extending fiduciary duty rights to workers.
This section concludes that the most practicable and effective method to ensure the
integration of worker interests in corporate decision-making is to amend corporate law to
impose on boards of directors procedural fiduciary duties owing to workers.
I. THE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR, AND CRITICISMS OF, THE SHAREHOLDER-DOMINANCE RULE
A. Fiduciary Duties Under Current U.S. Corporate Law
Under the current corporate regime, corporate board members and managers owe
fiduciary duties only to the shareholders of a corporation rather than to other corporate
constituencies or stakeholders.36 Fiduciary duties in corporate law consist of directors'
and managers' dual obligations to act with care and loyalty towards those to whom the
obligation is owed, namely shareholders. 37 For example, these duties proscribe corporate
acts that amount to self-dealing, uninformed decision-making, and ignoring the interests
of those to whom a duty is owed in decision-making. 38 These legal duties give
shareholders the right to sue board members or managers when these duties have
allegedly been breached. 9
Although shareholders, as the sole beneficiaries of fiduciary protections, can hold
directors and managers accountable for their decisions and thereby ensure consideration
of their interests in boardroom deliberation, the fiduciary duties they are owed do not
always guarantee good and honest corporate decision-making. 40 This is arguably due to
41the lax judicial review of management decisions under the business judgment rule
Nevertheless, fiduciary duties owed to shareholders have theoretically granted them
assurance that management will act in their best interest and have often provided
shareholders redress and remedies in cases where management has not acted in the
shareholders' best interest.42 Thus, despite the lax judicial review of management
36 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
37 See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (discussing the obligation a director has to act
with a duty of care "as distinguished from a duty of loyalty.").
38 
id.
'9 See Smith, 488 A.2d at 864 (illustrating an example of a suit where plaintiffs sued because of this).40 See Marleen O'Connor, Employees and Corporate Governance: Labor's Role in the American Corporate
Governance Structure, 22 CoMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 97, 107 (2000) (stating that "[F]iduciary law does not
provide much protection to shareholders because courts are reluctant to second-guess business decisions
under the business judgment rule. Even if workers have standing to sue to enforce such obligations, courts
are likely to continue to shy away from engaging in substantive review of business decisions.").
41 See id.; See also Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del.1984) (indicating judicial reluctance to
second-guess managers' business decisions and stating that "[ilt is a presumption that in making a business
decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that
the action taken was in the best interests of the company. Absent an abuse of discretion, that judgment will
be respected by the courts. The burden is on the party challenging the decision to establish facts rebutting
the presumption."); See also Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 629 (N.Y. 1979) (explaining that "[t]hat
doctrine bars judicial inquiry into actions of corporate directors taken in good faith and in the exercise of
honest judgment in the lawful and legitimate furtherance of corporate purposes.").
42 See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985)(describing a class action by corporate shareholders
against board. The Court held that the board was liable to the shareholders because the board acted in a
2007]
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decisions under the business judgment rule, the existence of fiduciary duties still offers
those who are owed such duties otherwise unavailable protections.43
Moreover, even if the business judgment rule's deference to corporate boards and
managements would prevent workers from realistically obtaining relief from them, other
considerations support extending directorial fiduciary protections to workers. 44 Legally
recognizing workers' roles in corporate governance by extending fiduciary protections to
them would foster improved labor-management relations,45 because it would relay to
managers and boards that they are partners in a common enterprise and thereby
encourage cooperation and loyalty between the parties.46 Also, as fiduciary law affords
beneficiaries disclosure rights, workers would receive more information about corporate
affairs that affect their investment in human capital.47 Lastly, notwithstanding the
business judgment rule's limitation on obtaining relief, the mere possibility of legal
sanctions would at least serve as an additional incentive to management to consider
worker interests and provide some assurance to workers that they can trust them.
48
Given the role of fiduciary duties in promoting honest, informed decision-making
and imposing a method of corporate accountability, 49 it is questionable why these duties
have only been owed to shareholders and not other groups of corporate stakeholders.
50
Indeed, the Committee on Corporate Laws, explaining the shareholder-dominant position
of the Delaware Supreme Court in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings,
Inc.,51 stated:
grossly negligent manner in approving amendments to a merger proposal and by failing to disclose material
facts before securing the stockholders' approval of the merger).
43 See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
44 See O'Connor, supra note 40, at 107 (concluding that "workers would benefit from recognizing a
fiduciary duty in three ways... symbolic and pedagogic.... disclosure .... [and it would] encourage
worker participation in strategic corporate decision making.").
45 Id. (stating that "the most significant aspect of employment law is symbolic and pedagogic because, in
many instances, the threat of formal sanctions is remote. Thus, legally recognizing the employee's role in
corporate governance may promote greater labor-management cooperation.").
46 See Marleen O'Connor, The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate Law to Facilitate Labor-
Management Cooperation, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 899, 954-55 (1993) (explaining how this would work
under her theory of fiduciary rights).
47 See O'Connor, supra note 46, at 107.
48 See O'Connor, supra note 46, at 955 ("[Fliduciary law would facilitate participatory work programs
because the possibility of legal sanctions would provide some assurance to employees who are uncertain
about whether to trust managers. Indeed, the very existence ofjudicial recourse for breach of fiduciary duty
may deter opportunistic behavior by firms. By reducing the risks of trust, fiduciary law would provide
support for cooperative corporate cultures by allowing employees to rely upon systems trust.").
49 See WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 204 (Eighth ed., Foundation Press 2002) (1980) (stating that "fiduciary duties
encourage thoughtful, honest decision-making by exposing corporate officers to the possibility of liability
in a derivative action due to a fiduciary duty violation. Practically, although derivative actions' likeliness to
deter fiduciary violations may be limited by shareholders' frequent difficulty in obtaining a recovery, they
still produce a general deterrent benefit because "managers, both in the same corporation and in other
corporations, might be deterred from future wrongful conduct by a few successful actions.").
'0 See Greenfield, supra note 15, at 287 (suggesting that "workers should have some kind of representation
on the board of directors or have some role in electing directors, and that directors of companies should be
held to have some kind of fiduciary duty to workers in the employ of their firm.").




Directors have fiduciary responsibilities to shareholders which, while
allowing directors to give consideration to the interests of others, compel
them to find some reasonable relationship to the long-term interests of
shareholders when doing so. In Delaware, this principle is modified when
the decision is made to sell the company, at which time the directors may
consider only the interests of shareholders.
52
Moreover, even if non-shareholder constituencies' interests may at times be considered
by management, the Delaware Supreme Court does not encourage the consideration of
such interests. 53 Therefore, the reasons for not extending these fiduciary duties to workers
must be both logically and normatively examined.
54
B. The Property-Based Justification for Shareholder Dominance
The traditional justification for shareholder dominance is that shareholders,
through their contribution of capital and hiring of management, 55 are the owners of the
56corporation and thus the corporation is arranged primarily to serve them. A variant of
this argument is that shareholders' shares convey an ownership interest or property right
in the firm that should not be limited. 57 As such, there should not be any consideration of
non-shareholder constituencies because it would shift control from the "owners" and
limit their property rights.55
Both variations of the property-based justification for shareholder dominance
mistakenly characterizes property rights as indivisible and unlimited.59 Property rights
are divisible in a number of ways, such as over time, through co-ownership, through
leases, easements, covenants, and mortgages. 60 Thus, ownership of property does not
necessarily equate with exclusive ownership of that property. 61 As such, management
can simultaneously take into account shareholder interests and worker interests as two
different groups of owners of the corporation.
62
Also, property rights have always been limited by reasonable regulation. For
example, a controlling shareholder does not necessarily have the right to buy and sell
52 Macey, supra note 21, at 34.
53 See id. at 34 ("in no case has the Delaware Supreme Court held that directors will be permitted to prefer
the interests of other constituencies over shareholders. Nor has the court decreed that they ought, as a
normative matter, to take such interests into account.").
54 See discussion infra Part II1.B. Although certain states' "other constituency statutes" permit corporate
officers to consider other constituencies' interests in decision-making, no state has imposed a fiduciary duty
on officers to weigh non-shareholder interests. Thus, the reasons for nationwide refusal to impose such a
duty must be understood.
55 See Greenfield, supra note 15, at 288.
56 Id.
7Id. at 289.
8 See id. at 288(stating that "[s]hareholders contribute the capital and hire the management.... The
authority of the corporation ultimately rests with them.").
59 See Singer, supra note 18, at 622 (explaining that "[p]roperty rights are more often shared than unitary,
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stock as she pleases, as it is unlawful for her to benefit from her dominant position in the
company and deprive minority shareholders their rights. 63  A shareholder's ability to
make unregulated stock purchases and sales is also restricted by Rule lOb-5 of The
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.64 The Securities and Exchange Commission
interpreted Rule 10b-5 to require "corporate insiders," such as controlling shareholders,
who possess material, non-public information to either disclose that information to the
public or abstain from trading.65 Thus, the law does not isolate shareholder proper 7
rights from governmental intrusion when the public interest warrants regulation.6D
Consequently, shareholder property rights cannot alone justify limiting fiduciary
protections to shareholders.
67
The property-based justification of shareholder dominance is also objectionable
on the ground that it illogically confers ownership status solely to shareholders. Just like
shareholders own shares, bondholders own bonds, suppliers own their inventory, and
workers own their labor. 68 All these groups contribute what they own to the corporation,
yet it is only the shareholders' contribution of money for shares that grants ownership
status.69  A law affording shareholders lone beneficiary status assumes that there is
something distinctive about the act of contributing money that justifies extending
fiduciary protections only to shareholders. 7 However, in light of a corporation's obvious
need for employees' labor, including their development of firm-specific skills unlikely to
be useful at other jobs, corporate law should safeguard their investment of labor.
71
Recognition of a broader concept of ownership, which considers the diverse nature of
stakeholder contributions, may warrant extending ownership status to all contributors to
the corporation and consequently provide the protection of fiduciary duties to non-
shareholder stakeholders as "owners" of the corporation.
7 2
Lastly, even assuming that consideration of a stakeholder's interest in corporate
decision-making depends on that stakeholder's property rights, workers possess such
property rights arising from their reliance interest in their jobs. 73 Although the Sixth
Circuit has rejected the legal recognition of workers' property rights in the corporation
63 See Jones v. H. F. Ahmanson & Co., 460 P.2d 464 (Cal. 1969) (illustrating how the California Supreme
Court held that a controlling group of shareholders, with 85 percent of the company's shares, violated their
fiduciary duty to the minority shareholders by exchanging their expensive, unmarketable shares in the
company with cheaper shares of another company they owned and selling these new, cheaper shares to the
public at a great profit. The acts of the majority shareholders created a public market for their otherwise
unmarketable shares, while the minority shareholders had no market to sell their shares. Therefore, the
controlling group of shareholders breached their obligation to the minority shareholders.).
64 See Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5 (West 2007).
65 See In re Cady Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 34-6668, 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
66 See id. at 913 (stating that "[w]e cannot accept respondents' contention that an insider's responsibility is
limited to existing stockholders and that he has no special duties when sales of securities are made to non-
stockholders.")
67 See id.
61 See Greenfield, supra note 15, at 293.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 293-294.
71 See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Employees As Stakeholders Under State Nonshareholder Constituency
Statutes, 21 STETSON. L. REV. 45, 53 (1991).
72 See Greenfield supra note 15, at 293 (explaining that "the law has long recognized that 'ownership'
assumes obligations as well as rights.").




stemming from reliance on their jobs due to a lack of precedential authority, 74 Joseph
Singer argues that common law doctrines and principles provide enough precedential
support to acknowledge workers' property rights that arise from their relationship with
companies.75 For example, courts recognize easements, which grant one a property right,
arising from reliance on access to another's land, to use that other person's land for a
certain purpose.76 Courts also recognize property rights arising from adverse possession,
which is an involuntary transfer of land from the initial owner to another party because
the latter has relied upon his use of the land like an owner for a statutorily prescribed
number of years.77 Recognizing the numerous legally enforceable property rights that
have grown out of reliance on access to property or on the continuation of a relationship,
Singer concludes that the Sixth Circuit, in Youngstown, could have drawn on such
property rights as precedential authority to extend to workers a property right in the
78Corporation.
Therefore, the property-based justification of shareholder dominance not only
ignores the divisible and limited nature of "ownership", but also does not justify
shareholder dominance given that workers can also be considered "owners" of the
corporation and can have reliance-based property rights.
C. The Agency-Based Justification for Shareholder Dominance
Advocates of shareholder dominance in corporate law also defend excluding non-
shareholder interests in boardroom deliberations by postulating that corporate law should
solely address the conflicts of interest that arise from a corporation's separation of
ownership and control. 79 This theory of the corporation, initially proposed by Adolf
Berle and Gardiner Means, 80 acknowledges that separation of ownership and control,
with the former resting with shareholders and the latter with management, was
increasingly characteristic of large corporations and examined the inevitable conflicts of
interest between the two groups.81 Generally, whereas shareholders sought corporate
decisions that maximize profits, managers would use their control to pursue their own
74 See Local 1330, United Steel Workers of America v. United States Steel Corp., 631 F.2d 1264, 1280 (6th
Cir. 1980) [hereinafter Youngstown]. In Youngstown, the United States Steel Corporation made a decision
to shut down its Youngstown plant although the entire town had come to rely on the United States Steel
Corporation for its livelihood. Id. at 1265. The workers of the Corporation asserted that they had acquired
a property right in the Corporation, in the nature of an easement, due to the long-established relationship
between them and the Corporation. Id. at 1280. They further alleged that this property interest in the
Corporation required the management to adopt strategies other than, or in addition to, shutting down. Id.
The Sixth Circuit, however, rejected the workers' arguments, did not recognize a worker property right
based on reliance, and refrained from imposing a duty on the Corporation to consider the impact of the
plant closing on the workers because the court determined that it lacked precedential authority to create
such a property right. Id. at 1281-82.
71 Singer, supra note 18, at 621.
76 Id. at 665-666.
77 Id. at 668-669.
71 Id. at 678.
79 David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DuKE L.J. 201, 220-21 (1990).
80 See generally ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (1932) (analyzing trends in corporate development).
8' Millon, supra note 78, at 220-21.
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interests such as entrenching themselves.82 To resolve the conflict, Berle and Means
viewed management's role as trustee for the shareholders. 83 Accordingly, the legitimacy
of management's exercise of control depends on whether management's decision fairly
protects the interests of the shareholders. 84  Corporate activity is understood as
shareholders, as individual property owners, simply pursuing their business interests
through their fiduciary, management.
85
The proposition that derives from this understanding of corporate activity is that
corporate law's aim should be to address and regulate the accountability problems that
flow from the trustee relationship. 86 Due to the numerous potential conflicts between
shareholders and managers, 87 contractarians view managers as "less than perfect agents"
who impose agency costs on shareholders. 88 As such, they conclude that the purpose of
fiduciary duties is to reduce these agency costs by creating a legal mechanism through
which shareholders can ensure that management acts in their best interest.
89
Although corporate law must address the inevitable agency problems that flow
from a separation of ownership and control, it does not follow that corporate law should
ignore agency costs incurred by other corporate stakeholders, such as workers. In the
labor context, workers also bear heavy agency costs.90  To be sure, workers are not
technically "masters" whose interests must be considered by the "servant" managers.
Nonetheless, workers bear "agency costs" in the same way shareholders do - both groups
contribute something of value to the corporation and must depend on management to act
honestly and loyally in maximizing the return on their input and sharing that return with
them.9' For example, management's neglect of worker interests may result in lower pay
or less secure jobs for workers, thereby reducing the return on their labor contribution.
92
Therefore, so long as reducing agency costs warrants granting the protections of fiduciary
obligations to shareholders, similar agency cost reduction concerns justify granting
workers fiduciary protections.
Furthermore, acknowledging that workers have many less market protections than
shareholders to reduce their agency costs, it follows that they require the protection of
fiduciary obligations even more than shareholders do.9 3 Workers have less informational
rights than shareholders 94 and, accordingly, possess less of an ability to analyze the
82 
id.
83 Id. at 221.
14 Id. at 224.
" Id. at 223-224.
86 id.
" Greenfield, supra note 15, at 296. For example, while shareholders would like managers to work as hard
as possible to maximize profits, managers, whose salaries are often fixed, may not work as hard as the
shareholders would like because they do not reap the gains or suffer the losses of their work. Id. Also,
whereas managers would like to take low-risk decisions to minimize the risk of bankruptcy and retain their
jobs, shareholders prefer the corporation to make high-risk decisions because the high risk could be
eliminated through diversifying securities in one's portfolio. Id.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 299-300.
91 Greenfield, supra note 15, at 300.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 303.
94 By granting only shareholders a general right to inspect corporate books, Delaware law is illustrative of
the information rights held by shareholders and not workers. 8 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(b) (West
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impact of managerial decisions on their interests. 95 Also, unlike shareholders, workers do
not vote for directors and major corporate actions, 96 removing any management fear of
worker backlash for ignoring their interests. And even if they do have the information to
determine that management is not acting in their interest, workers cannot respond as
effectively as shareholders. 97 It is more difficult for a worker to quit than a shareholder
to sell because a worker's input, labor, is less diversified, the labor market is less liquid,
and labor is less mobile. 98 This difficulty is compounded when the worker has developed
firm-specific skills, because the employer knows that it is that much harder for the
worker to find a new job at a different company that pays a comparable wage. 99
2007) (stating that "[a]ny stockholder, in person or by attorney or other agent, shall, upon written demand
under oath stating the purpose thereof, have the right during the usual hours for business to inspect for any
proper purpose, and to make copies and extracts from: (1) The corporation's stock ledger, a list of its
stockholders, and its other books and records; and (2) A subsidiary's books and records .... A proper
purpose shall mean a purpose reasonably related to such person's interest as a stockholder."); Seinfeld v.
Verizon Commc 'n, Inc., 909 A.2d 117, 123-25 (Del. 2006) (noting that its determination that plaintiff did
not show a "proper purpose" to inspect the corporation's books by failing to cite even "some evidence" to
establish a "credible basis" of management wrongdoing is only the second time the Delaware Supreme
Court has prohibited a plaintiff from inspecting the corporation's books due to his inability to meet even
this "lowest possible burden of proof').
95 See Greenfield, supra note 15, at 303 (explaining that "[iut is not clear ... why corporate law should step
in to reduce further the agency costs between managers and shareholders yet not between managers and
workers.").
96 See 8 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 21 l(b) (West 2007) (stating that "[u]nless directors are elected by written
consent in lieu of an annual meeting as permitted by this subsection, an annual meeting of stockholders
shall be held for the election of directors on a date and at a time designated by or in the manner provided in
the bylaws."); William A. Klein and John C. Coffee state:
By statute, common shareholders have the right to vote (at annual or specially called
meetings) for the election of directors and on certain "fundamental matters." Under most
state statutes, the "fundamental matters" that require a common shareholder vote include:
(1) mergers involving the corporation (except, under some statutes, when the corporation
acquires a much smaller firm), (2) any amendment to the certificate of incorporation, (3)
the sale of substantially all the corporation's assets, and (4) liquidation.
WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 204 (8th ed. 2002).
97 Greenfield, supra note 15, at 302.
98 Id. Whereas shareholders can avoid suffering the financial harm by investing in potentially hundreds of
stocks and offsetting investment losses from a poorly managed company with gains from other
investments, workers typically hold one or two jobs and face so they suffer more due to possible job and
income loss caused by poor management. Id. Also, the labor market is less liquid than the stock market
because selling and buying shares can easily and quickly be done in an efficient stock market without any
tangential costs, unlike the potentially lengthy process of quitting a job and finding a comparable substitute
and the costliness of relocating and foregoing income during unemployment. Id. Due to the labor market's
lack of liquidity and workers' inability to diversify investment of labor, workers are more pressured than
shareholders to continue investing in a firm that neglects their interests. Id. As such, workers cannot rely
on the sort of market protections available to shareholders to reduce agency costs and accordingly require
relatively more protection from fiduciary duties. Id.
99 Jonathan Macey, Externalities, Firm-Specific Capital Investments, and the Legal Treatment of
Fundamental Corporate Changes, 1989 DUKE L.J. 173, 191-92 (1989). When workers are required to
develop finn-specific skills through training, they often bear large opportunity costs in foregoing
employment as unskilled laborers because they are paid a lower wage than unskilled laborers during
training in return for a promise of a substantially higher, specified wage after the training period. However,
these skilled workers' foregone costs present firm managers the opportunity to take advantage of the
workers' sunk opportunity costs after the training period by reneging on their earlier promise of
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Therefore, both because workers bear agency costs similar to those borne by shareholders
and because workers possess fewer market protections to reduce their agency costs,
workers also need the protection of fiduciary duties as an agency cost-reduction method.
D. The Shareholder as Residual Claimant Justification for Shareholder Dominance
In addition to supporting shareholder dominance based on property rights and
agency cost-reduction theories, advocates of shareholder dominance contend that
shareholders' status as residual claimants in the corporation alone justifies shareholder
dominance. 100 Shareholders are residual claimants of the corporation because, when a
firm liquidates, they will be paid last out of firm assets.101 Unlike other stakeholders
whose claims on corporate assets are fixed and limited and who shy away from risky
investments as they stand to suffer from any investment loss without a corresponding
opportunity to directly share in firm profits, shareholders have an unlimited interest in
pursuing firm profitability due to their ownership of all remaining firm assets after
payment to other claimants. 0 3  As such, fiduciary duties run solely to shareholders
because, as residual claimants, "[t]he gains and losses from abnormally good or bad
performance are the lot of the shareholders, whose claims stand last in line."'
4
Also owing to their residual interest in the firm, shareholder dominance
supporters argue that shareholders' interests most closely reflect the interests of the
firm. 105 Shareholder interests are most representative of the entire firm's interests because
they have the greatest incentive to maximize long-term profits.10 6 Thus, advocates of
shareholder dominance reason that not only do shareholders equitably deserve the sole
protection of fiduciary duties due to their greater risk-bearing investment, but that they
substantially higher post-training wages and offering wages only slightly above unskilled laborer wages.
Managers remain confident that the skilled workers will accept even a slightly higher wage because the
opportunity costs they already bore in foregoing work as unskilled laborers are sunk. Managers are thus
especially capable of engaging in opportunistic behavior harmful to skilled laborers by benefiting from the
low wages they paid these workers during training without compensating their sacrifice as promised. Id.
O'Connor, supra note 46, at 923.
1 Black, supra note 34, at 4.
101 Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder, 40 U.C. DAvIS L. REv. 407, 447 (2006).
102 Id. Workers' claim on corporate assets is their salary or wages, and is commonly fixed. Similarly,
bondholders and creditors have limited interests in a corporation's profitability; mostly, they are concerned
with the firm's ability to repay them with the set interest. See id. (stating that "[tihe interests of all other
stakeholders are poor proxies for societal wealth because all other stakeholders have limited claims on the
assets of the corporation. Because they will bear the downside of any risk without the ability to capture its





'04 See Easterbrook & Fisehel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395, 403 (1983).
105 Velasco, supra note 100, at 447. Whereas other stakeholders are concerned primarily with securing
their fixed returns from the firm (either through compensation, loan repayment, or interest), shareholders
have a strong incentive to maximize firm profits. Unlike other stakeholders who risk suffering from firm
losses (through job insecurity or not receiving loan payments) but stand to gain little from gains,
shareholders bear the whole weight of risk. Investment losses' reduction in firm capital results in lower
share values for shareholders, while any gains are reflected in a boost in share value and a larger pool of
assets for them to share after firm obligations to other claimants are met. Thus, shareholders alone carry





are also best-suited to hold fiduciary protections because they serve as the best
representatives of the firm's interest in profit-maximization.
10 7
A theory granting shareholders fiduciary protections due to their residual interest suffers
from a narrow conception of residual interest because it focuses only on the interests at
stake in liquidation and not the spectrum of other, more likely, future possible
outcomes.' 0 8 When the various interests in other future outcomes are considered (such as
interests in undergoing an investment, pursuing a merger or acquisition, laying off
employees, closing a plant, issuing convertible bonds), the link between firm profitability
and the expectations of all stakeholders becomes clear, whether those expectations are
implicit or explicit. 109 Stakeholders' future expectations, or expected values, shape their
incentives to act to increase firm value." 0 As such, "residual interest" is more accurately
defined as involving "any situation in which the expected value of a contracting party's
future dealings with the firm increases as the firm's value increases, and decreases as the
firm's value decreases." '' Furthermore, this reformulation of "residual interest" requires
adjusting the definition of "residual claimant" from a stakeholder with an interest in
liquidation to "a person whose relationship to the firm gives rise to a significant residual
interest in the firm's success." 12 The latter definition explains how an employee who
has developed firm-specific skills has a residual interest in that firm concerning corporate
decisions that may bankrupt the firm because his particular skills will likely be useless
and uncompensated in another job.' 13 Similarly, a creditor has a residual interest in the
corporation regarding issuances of dividends that may render the debtor-firm unable to
fulfill debt obligations and frustrate his contractual expectation to be repaid.' 14 As such,
residual interests in a firm may include not only what a stakeholder is paid in the unlikely
event of liquidation, but also the diverse interests of a stakeholder for whom the expected
value of future dealings with the firm is positively correlated to an increase or decrease in
firm value.
115
Under such a conception of "residual interest," a company's workers - along with
its creditors, suppliers, and local community - also retain a residual interest in the
corporation.11 6  For employees who depend on stock options or profit-sharing as
compensation, an increase in firm value raises their compensation, thereby affording
them a residual interest in the firm. Even for employees with fixed wages, an increase in
107 id.
"o Black, supra note 34, at 18-19. Black cited the infrequency of firm liquidations relative to ongoing
business transactions, the triviality of corporate decisions during liquidation, and the likelihood that no
substantial firm assets will remain after non-shareholder claimants are paid and concluded that rights in
corporate law should not be distributed based on interests in liquidation only.
'09 Id. at 15. Stakeholders' explicit expectations arise from contract or statute, such as a convertible
bondholder's contractual expectation to share in firm profitability with common shareholders upon the firm
achieving a predetermined level of profit. Id. Implicit expectations result from expectations and likelihoods
that form "implicit contracts," such as an employee's expectation that he will receive a salary raise if the
firm profits are strong. Id. at 5.
1' Id. at4.
.. Id. at 15.
112 Id. at4.
"13 See Black, supra note 34, at 3.
114 See id.
115 Id. at 5.
116 d
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firm value may strengthen their job security, create funds for annual bonuses, or enhance
the value of pension and retirement benefits. 117  Accordingly, even if shareholders'
residual claimant status warranted extending the protections of fiduciary duties to them, it
does not require extending such protections solely to them, to the exclusion of other
stakeholders.1 8  Indeed, grounding fiduciary duties on protecting residual claimants
yields the problematic outcome of offering all stakeholders these protections.
The residual interest-based justification for shareholder dominance is flawed also
because its assertion that shareholders' interest is most representative of the firm's
interest ignores the effects of portfolio diversification on shareholders' considerations. 119
Due to the practically risk-immunizing effects of portfolio diversification, common
shareholders tend to prefer managements to undertake risky projects 20 that, if successful,
are estimated to generate large profits to less risky projects carrying a lower, but more
secure, return. 121 Yet the shareholders' investment choice may not coincide with all
stakeholders.122 Consequently, a management that undertakes such a risky investment
favored by shareholders may do so at the expense of other stakeholders., 23 Equally
significant, these same stakeholders, who alone bear the costs of Project C's possible
failure, are not owed any of the fiduciary duties owed to risk-diversifying shareholders. 1
24
Thus, a theory of shareholder dominance resting on a residual interest justification suffers
not only from a narrow conception of residual interest, but also from mistakenly
assuming that shareholder and firm interests coincide.
E. Shareholder Dominance Justified by Shareholders' Need for Contractual Gap-Filling
Some shareholder rights advocates, namely contractarians, support exclusively
allocating fiduciary duties to shareholders by basing such an allocation on the nexus of
contracts theory of the corporation. 12  According to contractarian theory, the various
stakeholders in a corporation are suppliers of different inputs and the corporation is
117 Greenfield, supra note 15, at 306.
18 Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Corporate Stakeholders: A Contractual Perspective, 43 U.
TORONTO L.J. 401, 403 (1993) (examining the role of the law in privileging certain stakeholders' interests).
119 Macey, supra note 21, at 29.
120 KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 49, at 268 ("Most shareholders invest only a small proportion of their total
wealth in the shares of a single corporation; they diversify their investment portfolios. Shareholders may be
risk averse with respect to their entire portfolios of investments but not with respect to the individual
components of those portfolios.") Id. An exception to shareholders' willingness to bear risk may be
controlling shareholders (who likely are heavily invested in one company) and investors who choose to
invest in a small number of firms. See id.
121 Macey, supra note 21, at 29. For example, as Jonathan Macey illustrates, with $1 million to invest,
between Project C, bearing a 50% chance of generating $500,000 and 50% chance of generating $10
million, and Project A, with a 50% chance of yielding $1 million and 50% chance of yielding $5 million,
shareholders would rather a corporation invest in the riskier Project C due to its higher expected return. Id.
For shareholders, Project C's risk of losing $500,000 can be eliminated, or at least minimized, by investing
in a large number of diverse corporations, many of whose risks are likely to result in large gains. Id.
122 Id. Assuming that this hypothetical corporation owes employees and creditors $1 million, the
shareholders' choice of Project C burdens the employees and creditors with a 50% likelihood that they will
not be paid what they are owed. Id.
12 Id. at 30.
124 Id.




126merely the sum of the agreements among those various stakeholders, or suppliers. A
corporation is nothing but the product of individual suppliers freely contracting according
to the contributions they are willing to make and the benefits they aim to derive. 127 The
outcome of this theory is a vision of corporate law that imposes only those rules that
duplicate the terms individual stakeholders would agree upon through actual
negotiations. 128 Thus, to the extent stakeholders wish to protect their interests through
certain means, they are free to bargain for them. It is not the province of corporate law,
however, to grant rights and impose obligations where none have been bargained for.1
29
Thus, for contractarians, similar to any other right or obligation, fiduciary duties are
rights that parties must negotiate for and the law should impose owing such duties to only
those stakeholders who would contract for them. 1
30
Contractarians then advocate that, as the stakeholder group willing to pay the
most for fiduciary duties, the law should impose owing such duties only to
shareholders.' 3 1 Though contractarians acknowledge that other groups of stakeholders
also value fiduciary duties, they surmise that other stakeholder groups do not value them
as much as shareholders. 132 Contractarians reason that shareholders value being owed
fiduciary duties the most because they face severe and unique contracting problems with
management. 33 While all other stakeholders are able to address their concerns through
contract, it is not feasible to predict and specify in advance how management should react
to a wide range of unforeseeable contingencies. 34 For example, as workers are primarily
concerned with wages, hours, and working conditions, their concerns are easily
predictable and suitable to contract. Indeed, pension guarantees, work hours, cost-of-
living wage adjustments are among the many provisions workers can bargain for.
135
Conversely, a contract cannot so easily predict and address all situations in which
shareholders' interest in maximizing firm profits directs management to act a certain
way. 136  Such contingencies can only be addressed by an open-ended promise by
management to act with care, loyalty, and honesty. 137 As such, fiduciary obligations are
owed to shareholders merely as a device to fill the unspecified terms of contingent
contracts between management and shareholders. 1
38
Moreover, according to contractarians, an understanding of fiduciary duties as a
mechanism to address contracting hurdles not only justifies allocating fiduciary
protections to shareholders, but also supports exclusively allocating these protections to
shareholders. 39 This leap from granting shareholders such protections to limiting the






3 ' Macey & Miller, supra note 118, at 416.
132 Id.
133 Id.
131 Id. at 407.
131 Id._at 417.
136 Macey & Miller, supra note 118, at 417.
137 id.
131 Id. at 407.
9 Id. at 410.
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on fiduciary duties relative to other stakeholders and the diminished value of fiduciary
duties when shared among groups of stakeholders.140  Consequently, the law should
recognize this result as what the parties would have agreed upon and thereby grant
shareholders the sole protection of fiduciary duties as a method of addressing
shareholder-specific contracting problems.
The contractarian rationale for shareholder dominance is flawed because it
neglects both the lack of workers' bargaining leverage and the contingencies workers also
face in bargaining.' 41 Relying on the contracting process to yield employment contracts
that adequately and fairly address worker interests wrongly assumes that workers and
management possess equal leverage in negotiations. 142 For instance, Joseph Singer cites
how in 1992, "given the legality of hiring replacement workers during a strike, the low
percentage of US workers who are union members, the availability of a reserve army of
the unemployed, the relatively low wages in the service sector, the increasing mobility of
capital, and increasing international competition," the Caterpillar company forced one of
the strongest US unions to end its strike simply by threatening to replace all the
workers. 43 The reasons Singer cites for workers' unequal bargaining power are not
confined to the strike he discusses; market forces unfavorable to workers regularly limit
their bargaining ability.' 4 4 Even the collective bargaining strength of some workers who
are represented by unions possessing greater bargaining leverage than individual workers
is tempered by the minimal worker-relevant issues subject to mandatory bargaining
between employers and unions, unions' inability to prevent certain major corporate
decisions harmful to workers, and the relatively low percentage of workers who are
represented by unions.' 45 Further, this disparity in bargaining power between contracting
parties is likely to result in a contract that imposes exploitative terms on the weaker party,
rather than a contract that reflects a "voluntary arrangement that maximizes the joint
interests of both parties., 146 Thus, because of the exploitative employment contract terms
that may result from depending on the contractual process, corporate law should not be
unresponsive to worker interests.
Contractarians also wrongly limit fiduciary protections to shareholders due to
their erroneous judgment that only shareholders face unforeseeable contingencies during
the contracting phase, thereby neglecting the unpredictable events in workers' contracting
process.147  Restraints on the numerous forms of employer opportunism, inability to
140 Id. at 410-11. For example, although shareholders may value fiduciary duties at $75 and workers may
value fiduciary duties at $50, if fiduciary duties are shared by the two groups, each values them only at $20
because corporate fiduciary duties become less valuable as they are dispersed onto additional groups. Id.
Accordingly, the likely outcome through rational bargaining is granting shareholders fiduciary duties for
$75 less what the shareholders pay the workers for exclusive receipt of fiduciary duties, some amount
greater than $20. Id.
141 Greenfield, supra note 15, at 314.
142 Id.
143 Singer, supra note 11, at 476.
"' Greenfield, supra note 15, at 316.
145 Richard Marens, Getting Real: Stakeholder Theory, Managerial Practice, and the General Irrelevance
of Fiduciary Duties Owed to Shareholders, Bus. ETHICS Q., 273-293 (1999)(arguing that Stakeholder
theorists have generally misunderstood the nature and ramifications of the fiduciary responsibilities that
corporate directors owe their stockholders).
'46 Singer, supra note 11, at 491.




foresee future productivity goals, difficulties in outlining job security provisions, and the
impossibility of describing the level of effort required by employees or the many facets
that comprise general working conditions represent some of the worker-related issues that
cannot easily or cost-efficiently be addressed at the employment contracting phase. 48 As
a result, it is clear that unforeseeable contingencies also limit workers' ability to address
all worker interests through contract.' 49 Therefore, so long as contractual gap-filling for
unforeseeable contingencies merits affording shareholders the protection of fiduciary
duties, similar gap-filling motives justify extending these protections to workers.
1 50
Furthermore, relying on contract law to redress workers who are harmed due to a
firm's action precludes workers from obtaining relief where the firm's harmful action
was contrary to an implicit firm agreement, rather than an express contractual
provision. 151 For instance, when applying to the Township of Ypsilanti for a tax
abatement on investments in two local plants, a General Motors spokesperson stated:
"Upon completion of this project and favorable market demand, it will allow Willow Run
to continue production and maintain profitable employment for our employees.",
52
Despite continued market demand, General Motors closed the Willow Run plant.
153
Nonetheless, General Motors was not found liable for the harm it inflicted on its Willow
Run plant employees because the General Motors spokesperson's statement was not a
"clear and definite contractual promise.'' 54 As the latter case demonstrates, contract law
fails to guard worker interests also due to its failure to protect the non-contractual
expectations of workers that arise from implied agreements.
II. FEASIBILITY OF GRANTING FIDUCIARY DUTIES TO WORKERS
Even if workers should be owed fiduciary duties due to their important status in
the corporation and the ineffectiveness of current avenues to address their interests, in
order to actually attain the protection of such duties, they must also be practically
feasible.155 Bernard Black keenly recognized the possibility that "no law yet devised can
protect employees against perhaps the largest risk they face - not being hired in the first
place."'' 56 If reforms in corporate law, such as the extension of fiduciary protections to
workers, do more harm than good, then even the theoretical soundness of - and practical




151 O'Connor, supra note 44, at 106.




154 Id. Compare Ypsilanti v. Gen. Motors Corp., 506 N.W.2d 556 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that the
company was not liable for the harm its employees suffered due to a plant closing after a company
spokesperson assured employees that the plant would continue production) with Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485
U.S. 224 (1988) (holding that the company was liable to shareholders for a company press release it issued
falsely denying that it was involved in merger negotiations because this misrepresentation was "material"
due to the substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would consider it important in making an
investment decision).
'55 Black, supra note 34, at 22.
156 Id.
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workers. 157 Thus, a proposal offering workers fiduciary protections must rely not only on
the demonstrable need for additional safeguards for worker interests and the theoretical
flaws in limiting fiduciary protections to shareholders. 5 8 Such a proposal must also
account for the likely effects of its implementation and account for its drawbacks and
obstacles. 159
A. The Problem Heterogeneous Worker Interests Poses for an Extension of Fiduciary
Duties to Workers
A potential drawback of granting workers fiduciary protections is the
impracticality of granting an entire worker population of a firm, with heterogeneous
interests, a fiduciary duty to consider their interests. 16 Different groups of workers within
a firm will have diverging interests and preferences regarding a certain corporate decision
or transaction stemming from their different roles, employment contracts, ages, genders,
experiences, seniority level, and mobility.' 6 1 For example, in designing a pension plan,
younger workers will have much different interests than older workers. 162 Similarly, in
carrying out a plan to layoff workers, the interests of workers with seniority differ from
new workers.' 63 Thus, even if workers were owed fiduciary duties, the conflicting
corporate decisions required by divergent worker interests would make it impossible to
delineate exactly what actions managements must take in carrying out their obligations to
workers.
The problem the heterogeneity of interests poses in extending fiduciary
protections to workers is overstated, however, in light of the similar divergence of
interests existing between groups of shareholders. 64 Although shareholders share the
basic goal of maximizing the value of the company and their future distributions, there
are numerous issues on which the views of different groups of shareholders will
diverge.165 Even on the issue of dividend distributions, shareholders may prefer different
policies depending on how they will be taxed for those dividends. 16 More troubling
conflicts may arise between shareholders who also have a contractual relationship with
the firm and shareholders who are interested solely as investors. 167 Shareholders who are
also officers, for example, are less inclined to favor risky decisions than shareholders




160 See Black, supra note 34, at 8.
161 See Henry Hansman, Worker Participation and Corporate Governance, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 589, 593
(1993) (discussing direct worker participation in corporate governance).
162 Id.
163 id.









the current regime of affording shareholders fiduciary protections has been workable.
The success of this current regime, in spite of the heterogeneity of shareholder interests,
casts doubt on the alleged debilitating effect diverging worker interests will have in a
corporate environment where workers are owed fiduciary duties. Since shareholders and
workers have similarly divergent interests, and fiduciary shareholder protections prove
workable despite shareholders varied interests, the extension of such protections to
workers with varied interests should likewise prove workable. 7 0
Yet, one has to assume that the heterogeneous interests of both shareholders and
workers place the same kinds of burdens on managements' fiduciary obligations. Indeed,
if the reason heterogeneous shareholder interests have not prevented the effective
application of fiduciary protections to shareholders does not apply to managements'
affording fiduciary protections to divergent worker groups, the success of the current
fiduciary regime does not justify extending fiduciary protections to workers with
different interests. 171 Therefore, before concluding that heterogeneity of worker interests
does not render the extension of fiduciary protections to workers unworkable, the
similarity between the effects of divergent shareholder interests and divergent worker
interests on managements' fiduciary obligations must be established.
172
Because shareholders' largely mutual interests have ensured the workability of the
current regime, it is likely that the mutual interests among workers will render extending
fiduciary protections to them workable. 73 Due to shareholders' common goal of
maximizing firm value and the value of distributions, situations in which shareholders'
interests diverge have proven to be the exception. 174 Generally, tax issues and
transactional relationships with the firm do not create friction in defining shareholder
interests.175 Likewise, the common characteristics of workers' interests, such as ensuring
job security, humane working conditions, and fair wages, forecast a frequent convergence
of worker interests to be considered by managements. 176 For instance, in Youngstown, it
was not the workers' diverging interests that precluded carrying out a fiduciary duty to
consider their interests.' 77 In fact, the Youngstown plants' 3,500 workers and family
members were unified in opposing management's neglect of worker interests in closing
the plants. 78 Furthermore, the convergence of the Youngstown workers' interests in a
plant closing is representative of a general unity of worker interests in many other
corporate decision settings. For example, workers generally prefer decisions that value
stability over expected return, and oppose risking bankruptcy by incurring huge liabilities
169 See id. (noting that conflicts do not involve a problem of collective choice, but rather involves two-party




172 See id. at 592-93.
'73 See id. at 591-92.
174 See id.
175 See id. at 592.
176 Greenfield, supra note 15, at 300.
177 See Youngstown, 631 F.2d at 1282.
171 See id. at 1265.
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to finance takeovers. 1 79 The frequent convergence of shareholder interests counters the
potentially disabling effect of owing differing shareholders fiduciary duties.
Additionally, the common union of worker interests concerning corporate decisions, in
which fiduciary duties are most relevant, averts the overstated debilitating impact of
extending fiduciary duties to workers.
B. The Problem Managers Serving "Too Many Masters " Poses for an Extension
of Fiduciary Duties to Workers
Even if the heterogeneity of worker interests does not render the extension of
fiduciary protections to workers unworkable or impractical, such an extension may be
unworkable because managements have the impossible task of having with to serve "too
many masters. '' 8° The "too many masters" argument bases its skepticism regarding
workers fiduciary protections on the premise that management cannot effectively owe
fiduciary duties to different constituencies with different interests.' 8' In advancing this
argument, the Committee on Corporate Laws of the American Bar Association's Section
on Business Law asserted:
If directors are required to consider other interests as well, the decision-
making process will become a balancing act or search for compromise.
When directors must not only decide what their duty of loyalty mandates,
but also to whom their duty of loyalty run (and in what proportions)
poorer decisions can be expected.
8 2
Thus, recognizing management's duty to consider the interests of two, often
conflicting, constituencies in corporate decision-making, the "too many masters"
argument holds that extending fiduciary protections to workers encumbers managements
with an impossible and irreconcilable obligation.
Resembling the overstatement of the heterogeneous worker interests problem, the
"too many masters" argument also overstates the problematic effect of owing both
shareholders and workers fiduciary duties for two reasons. 83 First, a recognition that
corporations have traditionally owed fiduciary duties to multiple, often conflicting,
classes of stockowners defeats the presumption that fiduciary duties cannot be owed to
constituencies with conflicting interests.1 For instance, despite preferred shareholders
often preferring projects less risky than those favored by common shareholders, corporate
boards and managers have typically been able to balance the interests of the two groups
179 Christopher J. Smart, Takeover Dangers and Non-Shareholders: Who Should Be Our Brother's
Keeper?, 1988 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 301, 305-6 (1988) (discussing the lack of protection for non-
shareholders in the event of takeovers).
'go Macey & Miller, supra note 118, at 411 (arguing that stakeholder statutes confuse the legal landscape by
forcing directors to please many masters with competing and conflicting interests).
181 Id.
182 The Committee on Corporate Laws, Other Constituencies Statutes: Potential for Confusion, 45 BUS.
LAWYER 2253, 2269 (1990).





in discharging their fiduciary duties.' 85 The ability to serve both preferred and common
shareholder interests establishes, at the very least, the possibility that boards and
managers can practically owe fiduciary duties to two constituencies with conflicting
interests.186 Thus the conflicting interests of shareholders and workers do not in itself
render the discharge of fiduciary obligations to both shareholders and workersan
impossible and irreconcilable task.
Second, and more important, the friction between shareholder and worker
interests does not make the requirement that managements serve more than one master
impracticable because these two groups often share interests and objectives.187 For
example, procedures and policies that improve worker morale, because they assure
workers' commitment to company goals by symbolizing appreciation of workers'
contributions, are not only good for workers, but also shareholders. 188 In fact, a study
examining shareholder support for proposals, sponsored by labor unions, found that
labor-sponsored proposals received a significantly higher percentage of votes than
proposals sponsored by private institutions and individuals and an equal percentage of
votes as proposals sponsored by public institutions. 189 Moreover, labor proposals aimed
at furthering worker interests, specifically, rather than seeking to improve corporate
governance structures, generated only a slightly lower percentage of favorable votes in
relation to other similar proposals. 90 Consequently, the studies indicate that shareholders
and workers usually agree on corporate decisions, even when labor and management
conflict. This support, that's statistically demonstrable, which shareholders lend to
workers' interests helps resolve the potentially irreconcilable task of serving too man
masters and further affirms that fiduciary protections can be extended to workers.
Indeed, even if at times worker and shareholder interests conflict regarding important
corporate decisions, the frequent convergence of their interests, at the least, justifies
reducing the high degree of concern commonly arising from such conflicts.
C. Analysis of the Protection Afforded to Workers Under the German and
Japanese Systems of Corporate Governance
In addition to the feasibility of extending fiduciary protections to workers as
evidenced by managements' ability to consider heterogeneous worker interests and
divergent interests between classes of stock, the success other countries have had in
offering workers significant protections further settles the feasibility of such a
1982proposal. Under both the German and Japanese systems of corporate governance, for
185 Id.
186 See id.
... Id. at 34-5.
18 8 Id. at 35.
"" Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate Governance: Shareholder Activism by
Labor Unions, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1018, 1052 (1998).
190 Id.
'9' See id.
192 Gulati, supra note 35, at 172.
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example, workers are afforded greater protections than they are under the US system.1
93
In Germany, corporate management is split into a two-tier system, consisting of a
supervisory Aufsichtsrat board and a managerial Vorstand board.' 94 The Aufsichtstrat
board, whose duties generally resemble duties of a US corporation's board of directors, is
comprised in significant part by employee representatives in addition to shareholder
representatives. 95 This board meets at regular intervals, receives audit and other
information, sets goals for the corporation, and assess the performance of, and hires and
fires the members of, the management board.' 96 Thus, because the board that is
responsible for the substantial tasks of delineating the corporation's objectives and
evaluating managers' performance is composed in large part by employee
representatives, the German system of corporate governance ensures consideration of
worker interests in corporate decision-making.
Although the Japanese corporate governance regime differs from that of Germany
in that it does not formally ensure concern for worker interests and shares the U.S.
system's strong concern for shareholder primacy, corporate practices stemming from
custom nevertheless assure Japanese workers that their interests will be taken into
account.197 One such Japanese custom is the practice of appointing long-term employees
as directors of the corporation.198 Although informal, this custom has assured that a
worker perspective will permeate corporate policy. 199 Japanese corporate governance is
also influenced by the banks that typically own between twenty and twenty-five percent
of a company's stock. 200 These banks play an important role in assuring the continuance
of weak firms by waiving a portion of the debt in exchange for the borrower adopting a
restructuring plan and the government promising to prevent bank failure.20 1 In helping
avert bankruptcy, the effect of these banks is to benefit stakeholders' interests such as
workers' jobs, suppliers' contracts, and lenders' repayment. 20 2 Moreover, the stabilizing
effect of these banks is complemented by the practice of cross-shareholding, under which
two companies, such as a supplier and a customer, agree to own one percent or so of each
other's common stock.20 3 In fact, more than fifty percent of large Japanese corporations is
estimated to be held by both banks and cross-shareholders. By owning such large
stakes in corporations, these bank and cross-shareholding arrangements stabilize
companies' volatility to market pressure and thereby bar outside shareholder influence.
205
Lastly, the traditional lack of shareholder suits against management, due to the judicial
deference afforded business executives, further insulates Japanese companies from
193 Mark J. Loewenstein, Stakeholder Protection in Germany and Japan, 76 TUL. L. REv. 1673, 1674
(2002) (examining the corporate governance mechanisms of Germany and Japan and their accommodation
of stakeholders concerns).
194 Id. at 1676-77.
'9' Id. at 1677.
196 See id.
197 Id. at 1685-6.
198 Id. at 1686.
199 Id.
0 Id. at 1687.
201 Id.
202 Id. at 1687-88.
203 Id. at 1688.
2
04 Id.




market pressure and shareholder influence. 206 The consequence of a system of corporate
governance that effectively immunizes companies from shareholder influence and fills
directorial vacancies with long-term employees is a structure protective of worker
interests.
20 7
The practical feasibility of extending directorial fiduciary protections to workers
is thus reinforced by both the German and Japanese systems' ability to afford worker
interests significant consideration via measures that guarantee representation of worker
interests in corporate decision-making. 20 The success of these two systems casts doubt
on the allegedly hindering effects of managements owing fiduciary duties to both
shareholders and workers. Admittedly, these systems' ability to respond to worker
interests is not without sacrifice. 209 For example, individual stock ownership in Germany
is very low, with large banks and other institutions accounting for most stock
ownership.210 The dearth of individual stock ownership can arguably be linked in part to
the minimal shareholder concern attendant to a system that grants labor a prominent
role. 2 1 Also, the presence of employees in German boardrooms makes decision-making
more costly due to increased friction during boardroom deliberations and thereby reduces
the board's ability to effectively monitor management. 212 Likewise, the implicit guarantee
of permanent employment in Japan pressures troubled companies to harm long-term
competitiveness by sacrificing profits or value rather than employees.
2 3
Nonetheless, the trade-offs between values in a system that affords workers
significant protections do not render the system infeasible or unworkable. 21 4 Such a
system may value the US corporate governance system's goal of efficiency less, but
efficiency is not the only goal worth pursuing.21 5 Certainly, a system granting workers
significant protections is not unfeasible simply because it gives primacy to goals such as
worker interests, social peace between labor and capital, and economic democracy.
21 6
Thus, the sacrifices attendant the German and Japanese systems of corporate governance
do not so much cast doubt on the feasibility of extending fiduciary protections to
employees as it simply reflects a different weight assigned to goals such as efficiency and
individual shareholder participation. 217 The success of the German and Japanese models
of corporate governance reveals that, apart from the merits of the systems, at the very
least, a system of corporate governance that ensures inclusion of worker interests in
corporate decision-making is feasible and workable.
III. ALTERNATIVE FORMULATIONS AND EFFECTS OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES THAT AFFORD
CONSIDERATION OF WORKER INTERESTS IN U.S. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
206 Id. at 1688-89.
20
7 Id. at 1690.
208 id.
209 Id. at 1674.
210 Id. at 1675.
211 See Brett H. McDonnell, The Curious Incident of the Workers in the Boardroom, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV.
503, 515-16 (2000) (examining the role of employees in corporate governance).212 See id. at 515.
213 Loewenstein, supra note 192, at 1686.
214 See McDonnell, supra note 209, at 525-26.
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Despite the demonstrated ability of a corporate governance system affording
workers fiduciary protections to withstand potential drawbacks and although Germany
and Japan offer models of systems that successfully grant workers broad protections, the
advisability of a particular corporate governance system that extends fiduciary
protections to workers ultimately depends on its likely effects. 2 18 If a system that extends
fiduciary protections to workers is less efficient in addressing worker interests or burdens
society with greater costs than other systems, it is not prudent to adopt it.2 19 Thus, before
recommending an extension of fiduciary protections to workers, alternative versions of
such a system must be critically analyzed and their costs and benefits must be carefully
weighed.
A. Analysis of an Absolute Extension of Fiduciary Duties to Workers
One version of providing workers fiduciary protections envisions the absolute
extension of directors' fiduciary obligations to workers. 220 Under this structure, a
director's or manager's duties of care and loyalty require consideration of worker
interests in making corporate decisions and engaging in transactions. 22 The fiduciary
obligations owed to workers give them a right to sue directors and managers if corporate
action is taken without due regard to their interests, in violation of the board's and
222management's duties of care and loyalty.
Opponents of an absolute extension of fiduciary protections to workers question
the desirability of an obligation to consider workers' interests in corporate decision-
making partly because it broadens the protection managerial decisions are afforded under
the business judgment rule. 223 They contend that, in combination, workers' and
shareholders' fiduciary duties expand managerial discretion so as to allow for almost any
corporate action to be justified as in the interest of one group or the other. 22 4 Thus,
although designed to address the neglect that workers' interests have historically met in
the boardroom, supporters of shareholder supremacy view corporate governance systems
that extend fiduciary protections to workers as counterproductive because of their
potential use as a shield for managerial initiatives that may be to the detriment of both
shareholders and workers.
225
Moreover, even if management plans to act in accordance with its dual fiduciary
obligations, shareholder supremacy supporters argue that management's ability to carry
out this duty is questionable due to the occasional, but significant, clash between worker
and shareholder interests regarding a given decision.226 Although the empirical
28 See Black, supra note 34, at 18.
219 GREENFIELD, supra note 28, at 183..
220 See Singer, supra note 11, at 501.
221 See id. (discussing possible interpretations of stakeholder laws).
222 See id. (outlining argument in favor of interpretation of stakeholder laws to create a private right of
action enforceable by workers).22 Id. at 500.
224 id.
225 Id.
226 See id. at 503-04 (stating that "[i]t will almost always be possible for management to argue that the




observation that worker and shareholder interests align more often than is commonly
227suspected suggests the practicality of extending fiduciary obligations to both groups,
this suggestion must be tempered by the critical observation that the infrequent
divergence of worker and shareholder interests often occurs concerning vital corporate
acts. In fact, in a host of important corporate decisions, shareholder and worker interests
are squarely at odds with one another.228 Indeed, workers are commonly heavily invested
in divisive corporate decision-making situations, where management must act in the
interests of shareholders due to their exclusive role as fiduciary beneficiaries. 229 The
decision to close a company plant illustrates the dichotomy of shareholder and worker
interests because, although a plant closing is likely to be opposed by workers concerned
with job loss, the positive effect that it may have on the company's net profit may prompt
shareholders to support it. 230 Shareholders are often willing to bear the risk of bankruptcy
inherent in some risky corporate transactions due to the risk-minimizing effect of
portfolio diversification, even though bankruptcy will strip workers of their jobs. 211 If
plant closings or layoffs will produce higher profitability, shareholders may support
them, even at the expense of employees. 232 The infrequency of such conflicts, as
227 See discussion supra Part I.B (refuting the "too many masters" argument; recognizing frequent
convergence of worker and shareholder interests).
228 See Jeffrey G. Macintosh, Designing an Efficient Fiduciary Law, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 425, 443 (1993)
(stating that "[w]here multiple constituencies have standing.... there is no guarantee that all will share the
same view of the social welfare function.".
229 See Terry O'Neill, Employees' Duty of Loyalty and the Corporate Constituency Debate, 25 CONN. L.
REv. 681, 687 (1993) (discussing mechanisms to accomplish redistribution of wealth from employees to
shareholders).
230 Illustrating the sort of vital corporate decisions on which shareholders and workers disagree, The
Committee on Corporate Laws wrote:
[A]dding other constituencies provisions to state corporation laws may have ramifications
that go far beyond a simple enumeration of the other interests directors may recognize in
discharging their duties. Directors might have a duty to oppose a transaction with
whatever means are available because it would have a demonstrably adverse impact upon
one or more of the constituencies (e.g., the acquirer plans to move the headquarters from
the small town in which the company had been rooted for decades resulting in
community disruption and loss ofjobs). Or directors might be called upon to decide how
much of the premium over market price being paid in an acceptable transaction should be
allocated among the various constituencies (e.g., how much should accrue to
communities in which plants might be closed; how much should be allocated to the
terminated hourly employees; and how much should be allocated to a supplier who might
lose his market).
The Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 182, at 2269-70.
23' Greenfield discusses shareholders' immunity from risky corporate decisions that result in investment
losses:
If we are to believe the assumptions of the contractarians, shareholders invest in a
number of different companies and thus have diversified their portfolios. They are
therefore risk neutral (and perhaps even risk prone) with respect to the decisions of any
specific company. Diversified shareholders prefer that the management of any particular
company they invest in makes decisions that maximize the expected value of the results,
even if the results also are highly variable._That is, shareholders will tend to prefer risky
decisions that may provide high payoffs but risk bankruptcy over decisions that provide
lower returns but have less risk of pushing the firm into liquidation.
Greenfield, supra note 15, at 308.
232 Id.
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indicated by the empirically demonstrable common convergence of worker and
shareholder interests, does not lessen their magnitude when they do arise.
233
Consequently, shareholder supremacy advocates conclude that an absolute extension of
fiduciary protections to workers will often be impractical and unworkable.
234
B. Analysis of Fiduciary Duties Owed to Workers Under "Other Constituency Statutes"
"Other constituency statutes" 235 can also be interpreted to give rise to a corporate
governance system that extends more limited fiduciary protections to workers.236 Under
this interpretation, other constituency statutes permit, but do not compel, management to
consider the interests of non-shareholder constituencies, such as workers, in making
certain specified corporate decisions.2 37 Notably, however, these other constituency
statutes do not give the non-shareholder constituencies a private right of action with
which to seek recourse when their interests are not considered.23 8 Thus, the statutes
permit worker interests to be considered in boardroom deliberations, but do not impose a
legally enforceable obligation on management to do so.
2 39
Despite the permissive nature of other constituency statutes, shareholder
supremacy advocates nevertheless oppose them. 240 The permissive nature of such
statutes effectively responds to the "too many masters" argument 241 ; however, these
permissive statutes provide managerial decision-makers the same shield they are afforded
under the system of absolute fiduciary obligation to both shareholders and workers.
242
Just as owing fiduciary duties to both groups in every corporate scenario allows
management to justify every action as benefiting one of the groups, the discretion
233 See supra notes 228-230 and accompanying text.
234 Macey, supra note 21, at 43-4. But see discussion infra Part III.C.
... See Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 182, at 2253 (defining "other constituency states").
236 See Singer, supra note 1I, at 499-500 (noting scholarship that argues in favor of interpreting stakeholder
to contain a private right of action).
237 See e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. L. § 717(b) (2007) (stating corporate directors "entitled to consider" effects on
employees and customers).
... Singer, supra note 11, at 499-500.
239 See id.
240 See Millon, supra note 79, at 234-36 (noting recent state law modifications to incorporate concerns
about non-shareholder constituencies and responses to them).
241 Arguing that "other constitutency statutes" do not excessively burden managers in allowing them to
consider the interests of many constituencies with potentially conflicting interests but, rather, benefit
managers due to their permissive nature and unenforceability, Macey states:
In one view, the "too many masters argument" implies that nonshareholder constituency
statutes make life more difficult for corporate managers and boards of directors. The
better view is that such statutes simplify life for incumbent managers of the large, public
corporation. After all, virtually any management decision, no matter how arbitrary, can
be rationalized on the grounds that it benefits some constituency of the corporation ....
Thus, the primary beneficiaries of nonshareholder constituency statutes are incumbent
managers, who can justify virtually any decision they make on the grounds that it benefits
some constituency of the firm. The benefits to the constituencies are, at best, weak.
Strong support for this assertion lies in the fact that not only are these statutes (with a
single exception) permissive, but they also do not afford standing to sue to any of the
nonshareholder constituencies that they purportedly are designed to benefit.





managers have under the permissive statute to consider workers' interests also clearly
permits justifying poor or self-interested management decisions simply by asserting that a
decision benefits workers.243 Therefore, as viewed by shareholder supremacy advocates,
other constituency statutes' aim to encourage consideration of worker interests will be
defeated by their use as a management defense mechanism.
244
Interestingly, workers' rights advocates often join their opponents in contesting
the prudence of other constituency statutes.245 For instance, Joseph Singer, an advocate
of worker-related changes in corporate law, acknowledges that these statutes may
function solely as a shield for self-interested managerial acts: "These laws thereby give
managers a long list of excuses for doing anything they like, even if it winds up harming
the corporation, as long as they can make a plausible argument that their actions are
,,246intended to benefit some constituency group. Thus, workers' rights advocates share
the concern shareholder supremacy supporters have regarding the potential use of other
constituency statutes as a shelter from liability for self-interested managerial decisions.
247
Beyond sharing shareholder supremacy supporters' concern with managers'
potential, self-interested manipulation of other constituency statutes, workers' rights
advocates also oppose these statutes because they do not impose any enforceable duties
on managers and directors.248 These advocates contend that the lack of enforceable duties
not only immunizes directors and managers from accountability, but provides no
incentive to further the interests of workers. 249 The permissive nature of the statutes,
lacking enforcement through a private right of action, renders them ineffective as a
guarantor of worker interests in corporation decision-making.250 Thus, other constituency
statutes provide no incentive to directors and managers to consider worker interests
because they cannot be held legally accountable for failing to do so.
251
Moreover, even when management may otherwise wish to consider worker
interests in decision-making, management's exemption from legal liability for failing to
do so, when contrasted with its potentially enormous legal liability for violating
enforceable obligations owed to shareholders, may effectively preclude any consideration
of worker interests. 252 Managers simply have no reason voluntarily to consider worker
interests if doing so carries the risk of violating enforceable duties to shareholders but
253failing to do so bears no consequences. Therefore, even if other constituency statutes
do not burden corporate management with the impossible task of owing fiduciary
obligations to two potentially conflicting stakeholder groups, they are imprudent because
they may shield self-interested managerial decisions from liability and because their
243 Id.
244 See id.
245 See Singer, supra note 11, at 499-501 (noting arguments by workers rights advocates against
interpreting other constituency statutes as simply expanding managers discretion).246 Id. at 500.
247 See id.
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permissive nature does not provide management with any incentive to consider worker
interests.
If other constituency statutes suffer from not going far enough in protecting
worker interests due to their unenforceability, then it follows that a more drastic and
effective system of fiduciary obligations is required. 4 Yet an absolute extension of
fiduciary protections to workers has faced opposition in light of both the allegedly
impossible task of serving two masters255 and the shield such an extension affords self-256
interested managerial decisions. 25 It is not surprising, therefore, that after comparing
numerous definitions of fiduciary duty, such as a duty to pursue shareholder interests
conditioned upon "consideration" of worker interests or conditioned upon acting in "good
faith" towards other constituents, Jeffrey MacIntosh's quest for a workable alternative
fiduciary law ends by observing: "The main difficulty arises in finding an alternative that
is both intellectually coherent and enforceable at reasonable cost, and that will not allow
managers freedom to escape their responsibilities."
257
C. Reanalysis of an Absolute Extension of Fiduciary Duties to Workers in Light of the
Actual Meaning and Function of Fiduciary Duties
The feasibility of an intellectually coherent and cost-justified corporate
governance system that extends fiduciary protection to workers lies in recognizing
fiduciary duties' actual meaning and function. 258  Fiduciary duties do not mandate a
specific substantive outcome that boards must reach in pursuit of a certain group's
interests, but rather they require boards to procedurally conduct themselves in a certain
way.259  The duty of care requires boards to inform themselves of pertinent facts,
254 Id.
255 See The Committee on Corporate Law, supra note 182, at 2269 (arguing that requiring directors to
consider the various interests of numerous constituencies will transform an already difficult task of acting
in the corporation's and shareholders' best interest into a harmful balancing act between interests).
256 See supra notes 242-247 and accompanying text.
257 MacIntosh, supra note 228, at 473.
258 Greenfield, supra note 28, at 238-39.
259 Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000). In Brehm, in characterizing the duty of care standard
as a procedural obligation and not a duty requiring a particular substantive outcome, the Delaware Supreme
Court stated:
As for the plaintiffs' contention that the directors failed to exercise "substantive due
care," we should note that such a concept is foreign to the business judgment rule. Courts
do not measure, weigh or quantify directors' judgments. We do not even decide if they
are reasonable in this context. Due care in the decisionmaking context is process due
care only. Irrationality is the outer limit of the business judgment rule.
Id. (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original); see also In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative
Litigation, 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996). The Caremark court stated:
[A] director's duty of care can never appropriately be judicially determined by reference
to the content of the board decision that leads to a corporate loss, apart from
consideration of the good faith or rationality of the process employed. That is, whether a
judge or jury considering the matter after the fact, believes a decision substantively
wrong, or degrees of wrong extending through "stupid" to "egregious" or "irrational",
provides no ground for director liability, so long as the court determines that the process
employed was either rational or employed in a good faith effort to advance corporate
interests.




investigate various alternatives and outcomes, and sufficiently deliberate about a proposal
260before taking action. So long as these requirements are met, the business judgment
rule protects directors from a breach of their duty of care and generally precludes judicial
review of a deal's substantive terms. 26  Also, the foremost concern of corporate law's
duty of loyalty is in regulating self-interested transactions between managers or directors
and the corporation 262 through laws such as Delaware's requirement that directors and
managers refrain from self-dealing, unless the transaction is approved by disinterested
directors after full disclosure, disclosed to and approved by shareholders, , or a court
decides it is fair to the corporation.263 Thus, like the duty of care, the duty of loyalty
mainly compels taking certain procedural steps before a board enters into a transaction
involving self-dealing. 264 Presumably, extending fiduciary protections to workers would
afford them the same right shareholders have to approve the self-dealing transaction
before it can be effected, but that right simply imposes an obligation on boards to obtain
approval from both shareholders and workers. Surely this right, alone, does not create an
impossible task in serving two masters, because it merely requires approval from two
260 See KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 49, at 152-53 ("Under the majority formulation, any business
judgment is immune from judicial review only if the directors first followed adequate procedures in
reaching it.").
261 Kamin v. American Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807 (Sup. Ct. 1976), aff'd, 387 N.Y.S.2d 993 (App. Div.
1976). The Kamin court wrote:
The directors are entitled to exercise their honest business judgment on the information
before them, and to act within their corporate powers. That they may be mistaken, that
other courses of action might have differing consequences, or that their action might
benefit some shareholders more than others present no basis for the superimposition of
judicial judgment, so long as it appears that the directors have been acting in good faith.
Id. at 812.
262 KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 49, at 165.263 DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW § 144.
264 For example, before a director can enter into a self-dealing transaction, most states require her to
disclose her conflict of interest and obtain either shareholder or judicial approval of the transaction. See,
e.g., DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW § 144. Some Delaware courts and a number of other states regard adherence to
these statutes' procedures as eliminating the need for substantive judicial review and approve the
transaction if it does not violate the business judgment rule or constitute waste. See In re Wheelabrator
Technologies Litigation, 663 A.2d 1194, 1203 (Del. Ch. 1995) (holding that "Where there has been
independent shareholder ratification of interested director actions, the objecting stockholder has the burden
of showing that no person of ordinary sound business judgment would say that the consideration received
for the options was a fair exchange for the options granted.");See Puma v. Marriott, 283 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch.
1971); See Aronoff v. Albanese, 446 N.Y.S.2d 368, 371-2 (App. Div. 1982). But see Marciano v. Nakash,
535 A.2d 400 (1987) (holding that although courts will approve of self-interested transactions ratified, after
full disclosure, by disinterested directors or shareholders, if an independent board committee is unavailable
or the shareholders are in a deadlock, courts must apply the "entire fairness" test."). Directors in some other
states, however, who follow the procedural requirements for self-dealing transactions only shift the burden
of proof to the plaintiff to prove that the transaction was clearly unfair. Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-
Dandini Co., 241 P.2d 66, 74-75 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952). However, as indicated by Delaware courts who
use the comparably stringent requirements for lawful self-dealing by controlling shareholders (who owe
minority shareholders fiduciary duties) by applying the seemingly substantive "entire fairness" test instead
of the business judgment rule after evidence of informed, disinterested shareholder or board approval, even
careful judicial analysis of "entire fairness" centers on closely scrutinizing the facts on record to assess the
effectiveness of the board or shareholders' approval of the self-dealing transaction. See Kahn v. Lynch
Communication Systems, 638 A.2d 1110, 1120-21 (stating that board approval of a controlling
shareholder's self-interested merger transaction does not satisfy the "entire fairness" test unless the board
was "truly independent, fully informed, and had the freedom to negotiate at arm's length.").
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groups and does not require engaging in a substantive transaction favoring one
constituency over another. Thus, in a typical scenario where worker and shareholder
interests conflict, as where workers prefer the firm to invest in a less risky venture than
the one favored by shareholders, all a fiduciary obligation extending to both workers and
shareholders does is require consideration of both groups' interests under the duty of care
and abstention from self-dealing transactions unless approved by both groups. Such an
extension of fiduciary duties does not mandate a particular substantive result. Therefore,
it is not rendered unworkable by being accorded to two groups of stakeholders.
Also, an extension of fiduciary protections to workers is not likely to be
unresponsive to worker interests due to managements' use of this extension as a shield
because, unconstrained by the current dominance of shareholder supremacy in law,
directors are likely to act fairly and equitably, and to consider worker interests in
decision-making. 265 A study by Kent Greenfield and Peter Kostant examined how the
shareholder supremacy rule affects board decision making by conducting two rounds of
26ultimatum games. 66 In the first round, in negotiating deals, proposers and respondents
acted for themselves, bargaining based on whatever factors were important to them.267 In
the second round, the proposers had an obligation to act as an agent to a third party,
thereby acting to maximize the retum to that third party. 268 Greenfield summarizes the
outcome: "When proposers acted for themselves, they offered amounts to respondents in
the range consistent with other experiments. But when they acted as an agent, trying to
maximize the return to a third party, their willingness to share decreased significantly."
269
The study suggests that, in the absence of shareholder supremacy, boards would consider
worker interests in decision making in an effort to act fairly.270 In fact, this suggestion is
buttressed by reviewing the effect of anti-takeover statutes passed in the 1980s.
271
Although the anti-takeover statutes granted greater discretion to managerial decisions by
allowing some acts designed to thwart hostile takeovers, these statutes actually benefited
workers by increasing wages one to two percent because the statutes alleviated fears of
legal liability arising from shareholder discontent and thereby permitted boards to weih
worker interests more heavily than possible before the anti-takeover statutes.
Therefore, given boards' likely willingness to make fair and equitable decisions when
unimpeded by the law, opponents of extending fiduciary protections to workers are
mistaken in assuming that granting these protections to workers will merely shield self-
interested managerial decision making and prove ineffective as a tool to protect worker
interests.273 Rather, the likely outcome seems to be that requiring boards to owe fiduciary
265 Greenfield, supra note 28, at 179-80 (arguing that "Loosened from their legal duty to look after the
interest of shareholders only, directors and managers would be able to allocate the corporate surplus with
an eye to principles of fairness, equity, and just desserts, all of which they area legally prohibited from





270 Greenfield, supra note 28, at 177.
271 Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Is There Discretion in Wage Setting? A Test Using
Takeover Legislation, 30 RAND J. ECON. 535 (1999).
272 Id.




obligations to workers will provide boards with the necessary legal sanction to effectively
consider interests that they are otherwise predisposed to consider.274
Moreover, even in cases where managements would seek to use their dual
fiduciary obligations to shelter their self-interested decisions from legal liability, the
technical enforcement of this dual fiduciary obligation will not allow managements to
justify decisions that violate obligations towards one group merely because they meet
obligations to another group.275 Managements' dual fiduciary duties require them to act
in accordance to their duties to both shareholders and workers, not just one or the
other. 276  Thus, violating the duty of care owed to shareholders by not considering
shareholder interests in a given corporate decision is not protected simply because
management did consider worker interests.
277
Similarly, in the context of the duty of loyalty, the law's general proscription of
self-dealing is not weakened by owing this duty to both shareholders and workers.
278
Whether a director steals from shareholders or both shareholders and workers, the
director has breached his duty of loyalty; extending the duty of loyalty's general ban on
self-dealing to workers does not make the director's theft more defensible. 27 9 On the
contrary, such an extension would make it harder for managers and directors to self-deal,
because more corporate stakeholders would be monitoring board and management
actions.280 Thus, even when the extension of fiduciary protections to workers does not
prompt managements to act fairly towards workers, and instead triggers self-interested
managerial decision making under the guise of furthering some stakeholder interest, such
self-interested decisions will not be protected if they violate the fiduciary duties owed to
either shareholders or workers.
281
D. Costs and Benefits of an Absolute Extension of Fiduciary Duties to Workers
274 See id.
275 Arguing that owing more than one stakeholder group will not shield managements' self-interested
decisions, Greenfield states:
The only way that having more and broader responsibilities would make it easier for
managers to avoid responsibility is that they could use one obligation as a defense to a
claim that they failed at meeting another. But this is not a function of the number and
scope of responsibilities but how they are enforced, and corporate law duties are simply
not enforced in a way that would allow managers to play one duty offthe other.
Id. at 139.
276 Id.
277 Id. (stating "No manager would be able to erect a defense to a shareholder claim by saying she was
unable to pay attention to the impact of the decision on shareholders because she was thinking at the time
about workers. The managers would have to do both.").
278 Greenfield, supra note 28, at 139.
279 id.
280 Arguing that extending protection of managers' fiduciary duties to nonshareholding stakeholders will
not only avert weakening fiduciary obligations, but rather actually help prevent self-deaing, Greenfield
states:
In corporate law, loyalty requires managers not to engage in self-dealing. Such an
obligation would not be weakened at all by including workers among the beneficiaries of
managers' fiduciary duties. Rather, adding to the number of people who benefit from
managers' fiduciary duties will make it more difficult for managers to self-deal. More
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Regardless of the large disparity between shareholder supremacy supporters'
estimated high cost of a system extending fiduciary protections to workers and the actual
low cost of the system demonstrated above, to warrant adoption, such a system must
provide benefits sufficient to justify bearing even minimal costs. To be certain, this
corporate governance system bears efficiency costs--increased boardroom deliberation
and tension combined with a lack of certainty regarding the amount of consideration the
respective interests of workers and shareholders are to be given impede efficient decision
making. 82 The system also bears financial costs, 83 such as expenses required to obtain
advice about worker interests,284 loss of shareholders' capital contributions due to a
decreased ability to monitor management, 285 and a potential increase in corporate
resources diverted to defending costly litigation.286 Also, the uncertainty a new, more
complicated fiduciary law presents may deter investment of capital. Thus, the analysis
concerning the desirability of a system of corporate governance that grants workers
fiduciary protections narrows down to an assessment of whether the system's benefits
outweigh its costs.
2 88
Insofar as the historic neglect of worker interests in major corporate decision
making has inflicted social harms such as high unemployment rates, a widening gap
between rich andIoor, increased demand for public welfare assistance, and untreated
medical illnesses, certainly a corporate governance system that considers workers' well
being will produce the benefit of reducing these harms. 29 As stated above, this does not
saddle directors with the impossible task of both closing a plant in accordance with
shareholder wishes and keeping a plant open to satisfy workers. 291 Rather, workers'
fiduciary protections compel consideration of worker interests in decision making and,
even if directors ultimately decide to shut the plant down, this duty would require them to
provide the displaced workers with appropriate relief such as adequate severance
212 See Macintosh, supra note 228, at 444 (arguing that the uncertainty of requiring management to both
maximize shareholder wealth and consider other interests, in part, makes this consideration standard
"fundamentally incoherent").
283 Greenfield, supra note 28, at 239-40.
284 Id. (stating "[i]ndeed, as boards of directors typically include strong advocates of shareholders interests,
perhaps boards who ascribe to a more robust conception of fiduciary duty doctrine would find it useful to
invite representatives of other stakeholders to be among their members .... To the extent that this new
version of fiduciary duty imposes more difficult obligations, the cost of monitoring the behavior of
directors will likely increase.").
285 Id. at 38 (stating "[plerhaps a loosening of management's fiduciary duty to shareholders will make
shareholders less likely to invest, because they will lose some of their legal power to monitor and constrain
management.").
286 See The Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 182, at 2270 (stating "[i]f directors have, or may
have, recognized legal duties to other constituencies, perhaps a new class or classes of plaintiffs will have
access to the courts to redress perceived breaches of those duties or to challenge directors' failures to take
various competing interests into account.").
287 See Macintosh, supra note 228, at 445 ("The intellectual incoherency of the standard creates great
uncertainty about how judges will apply it.").
288 O'Connor, supra note 4, at 1259.
289 See supra notes 4-14 and accompanying text.
290 See O'Connor, supra note 4, at 1 197-98 (asserting a relationship between management decisions and
resulting work wellbeing).




292payments and job retraining. Therefore, even if granting workers fiduciary protections
does not always require the substantive result that they keep their jobs, at the very least it
does help minimize the unjustifiable social costs caused by a total neglect of worker
interests.
Moreover, the unpredictable dependence of workers' jobs on a decision-making
process that excludes consideration of their interests has contributed to the
underperformance of U.S. businesses internationally.2 93  Corporate law's exclusive
concern with shareholder interests has sanctioned corporate decisions and acts that have
stripped workers of job security. 294 Companies with low-margin operations have cut jobs
to lower labor costs and increase profit. 295 Leveraged buyouts significantly increase the
296debt of the acquired company, leading to massive layoffs.. The resulting loss of job
security has reduced workers' incentives to increase productivity. 297 Also, along with the
cost of stagnant productivity, workers' substandard work effort imposes additional
monitoring costs. 2 8 The disincentive that a lack of job security fosters results in work
performance that barely meets minimum standards,29 requiring employers to incur high
monitoring costs to avoid shirking. 300  Therefore, decision making focused solely on
shareholder interests has contributed to a national economy with underperforming
businesses plagued by stagnant productivity and high monitoring costs.
30'
By imposing on directors an enforceable obligation to consider worker interests in
boardroom deliberations, extending fiduciary protections to workers will help assure job
security and, consequently, contribute to increased productivity. 30 2 When workers are
assured that the corporate decision-making process includes consideration of their
interests, they are induced to work harder and more efficiently, confident that their hard
work will not result in a board's exclusively profit-driven decision to strip them of their
jobs. 30 3 Indeed, as Marleen O'Connor notes, productivity is likely to be higher in job
markets where dedicated, long-term employees are offered incentives to maximize
production through job security, higher wages, and seniority benefits than in markets
where productivity relies on extensive monitoring and the negative and discouraging
292 O'Connor, supra note 4, at 1194.
293 Singer, supra note 11, at 508-09.
294 O'Connor, supra note 4, at 1196-7.
295 Id. at 1196.296 Id. at 1201.
297 Singer, supra note 11, at 509.
298 O'Connor, supra note 46, at 908.
299 See id. at 918-23. O'Connor explains that maximum worker productivity depends on workers' trust in
management that managers will not engage in opportunistic behavior and renege on implicit employment
agreements concerning job security and workplace conditions. However, when the labor market becomes
volatile, the security of these long-term employment agreements is jeopardized because workers risk job
loss due to plant closings, layoffs, acquisitions, or bankruptcy and fear opportunistic behavior by managers
in withholding implied benefits such as severance pay and pay increases based on seniority. This mistrust
creates a "prisoner's dilemma" in which workers are tempted to withhold their work effort fearing
imminent job loss and managers are tempted not to make commitments concerning job security as it may
cause employees to shirk. As such, the lack of cooperation between managers and workers that results
from this prisoner's dilemma poses a major obstacle to optimizing worker performance and production. Id.
300 Id.
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work environment this monitoring creates.30 4 Thus, extension of fiduciary protections




In addition, although owing an additional stakeholder group enforceable fiduciary
duties can be deemed a cost due to the likely increase in litigation, it can also be regarded
as serving an important social role by enlarging the group of persons who oversee
executive behavior. 306  In corporate proxy contests, managements of publicly held
corporations rarely lose, indicating a lack of adequate oversight by shareholders.30 7 A
number of factors explain managements' likely success in proxy contests.3"8 First,
whereas managements can generally use corporate funds to finance expensive proxy
contests, shareholders usually need to incur these high costs themselves. 30 9 Moreover, in
light of portfolio diversification, which allows shareholders to nearly eliminate the risk of
investing in a poorly managed company, shareholders do not have the incentive to
expend money, time, and attention to proxy contests. 310 Finally, a shareholder has a
further disincentive to spend time and money on waging a proxy contest because doing so
would gratuitously create a value for all shareholders even though only she bore the
costs.3  Thus, even though these factors explain shareholder passivity, they also reveal
the need for greater oversight of executive behavior.
312
In granting another group of stakeholders beneficiary status, extending fiduciary
obligations to workers would help fill the void in executive oversight by allowing
workers to hold directors and managers liable for their unlawful acts. 313 Indeed, as
Marleen O'Connor observes, "[e]mployees are uniquely situated to review executive
inefficiency and self-serving behavior."3 4 Through their associating with the company
on a daily basis, workers experience the product of their work and skill, observe
inventory levels, witness managers' dispositions, and partake in company gossip.
31 5
Besides observing executive decision making from a unique vantage point, workers are
much more willing to challenge board decisions and actions than shareholders, because
management decisions affect them more.3 16 Since workers' investment in the firm is
much more firm-specific and less transferable than shareholder investments, unsatisfied
workers, unlike shareholders, cannot simply either sell their investments in a liquid
market or avoid the impact of bad management by portfolio diversification. 3  For a
worker to "sell her investment," she must quit and risk detrimental financial
consequences.318  Therefore, due to the unique perspective workers have regarding
'04 O'Connor, supra note 46, at 908.
305 See id.
306 See O'Connor, supra note 4, at 1252.
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313 O'Connor, supra note 4, at 1255.
314 Id.
31 Greenfield, supra note 15, at 301.






executive conduct and their added incentive to challenge such behavior, extending
fiduciary protections to workers produces the socially beneficial outcome of an increase
in the level and effectiveness of executive behavior oversight. Moreover, in light of the
potential benefits conferred by a corporate governance system that extends fiduciary
protections to workers--including reduced unemployment, decreased reliance on public
assistance, increased job security, increased productivity, decreased monitoring costs for
U.S. businesses, and more effective oversight of corporate misbehavior--the relatively
minimal efficiency and financial costs it may create are certainly worth incurring.
CONCLUSION
Under the current formulation of corporate law, directors and managers owe the
fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to shareholders only. Although advocates of this
shareholder supremacy rule justify limiting fiduciary protections to shareholders based on
a number of theories, such as property, agency, residual claimant, and contracting
problems, these rationales generally either overlook workers' stakeholder interests or rest
on inaccurate notions of corporate terminology.
Notwithstanding the flawed arguments for restricting fiduciary duties to
shareholders, the advisability of extending workers these protections would also depend
on its feasibility, namely its likely effects and drawbacks. First, supporters of shareholder
supremacy argue that extending fiduciary protections to workers is unfeasible because
worker interests are too heterogeneous to owe all workers the same fiduciary duty.
However, just as a common goal of profit maximization has led to different classes of
stock being successfully protected by the same fiduciary duties, it is likely that workers'
shared interests in job security, safe working conditions, and fair wages will also allow
them to feasibly be protected by fiduciary duties extended to them as a group. Second,
shareholder supremacy supporters contend that, in light of the divergent interests between
shareholders and workers, directors cannot owe fiduciary duties to both groups. Yet this
argument is overstated both because directors have always owed fiduciary duties to
different classes of stock, with often opposing interests, and because workers and
shareholders share more interests than typically postulated. In addition to the inability of
the latter two arguments to cast doubt on the feasibility of according workers fiduciary
protections, the viability of a system affording workers greater protections is shown by
the success met by both the German and Japanese corporate governance systems.
Although both systems' relatively broad grant of worker protections carries certain
economic sacrifices, at the very least, the systems prove that a corporate governance
regime that affords workers substantial protections is both feasible and workable.
Although effectively countering potential drawbacks to a system that extends
fiduciary protections to workers establishes that such a system may be feasible, a
particular fiduciary law's likely effects, costs, and benefits also must be assessed before
conclusively recommending it. A corporate governance system that grants workers
broader protections might include either a fiduciary law that compels directors to owe
workers fiduciary duties or a law that permits directors to consider worker interests in
decision making. Both the absolute and permissive fiduciary laws may arguably serve as
a shield for management decisions. However, as statistical evidence and experimental
tests indicate, when the law permits management to consider worker interests, it is likely
2007]
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to do so. Yet, a permissive fiduciary law is rightly accused of not going far enough in
protecting worker interests by merely giving directors discretion to consider their
interests. Thus, an absolute fiduciary law is the preferable alternative by forcing directors
to consider workers' interests.
Nevertheless, even an absolute fiduciary law may be deemed flawed if it burdens
management with the impossible task of serving "too many masters." The supposed flaw
fails to undermine an absolute fiduciary duty, however, because it misconstrues the
meaning and function of the fiduciary duty. Once the fiduciary duty is understood not to
compel particular substantive decisions by the board, but rather require that the board
take certain procedural steps, it is clear that the "too many masters" argument does not
make an absolute fiduciary law unworkable.
Finally, to justify implementing this absolute fiduciary law, its benefits must
outweigh costs. A law requiring directors to owe workers fiduciary duties carries the
potential costs of increased boardroom tension and deliberation, lack of certainty, and
costly litigation. In spite of such costs, if the benefits of such a law outweigh them, the
law should be adopted. A non-exhaustive list of possible benefits of an absolute
fiduciary law include lowering unemployment, decreasing reliance on public assistance,
providing medical treatment to discharged employees, increasing U.S. business's
productivity and lowering monitoring costs, and ensuring more aggressive oversight of
executive behavior. Given the magnitude of such benefits, especially relative to costs, a
law that extends fiduciary protections to workers should be adopted.
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